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I. INTRODUCTION
With the adoption of "Lord Campbell's Act"' in 1846, the En-
glish Parliament initiated a movement to reform the Anglo-Ameri-
* Professor of Law, Emeritus, Vanderbilt University; Professor of Law, Hastings Col-
lege of the Law.
1. An Act for compensating the families of persons killed by accidents, 1846, 9 & 10
Vict. ch. 93 [hereinafter cited as Lord Campbell's Act]. For general discussions of subse-
quently enacted legislation in the American states, see D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES § 8.2 (1973); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 93-106
(1935).
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can common law with respect to the recovery of damages for
wrongful death and the survival of personal causes of action upon
the death of a party. Though the reform was long overdue and
much needed, the speed and magnitude of the change in the law
following the English innovation unfortunately produced a bewil-
dering variety of legislative enactments and judicial interpretations
of the pertinent statutes in the United States. As a consequence of
this uncoordinated development, fifty-one diverse bodies of law
currently exist in this country governing the rights and liabilities
of the tortfeasor, the victim-decedent, and the decedent's relatives
after a wrongful killing of a person has occurred.2 Furthermore, the
legal profession and state legislators have not received too-little-
and-too-late efforts to achieve some degree of uniformity of the law
in this field with any enthusiasm; indeed, the efforts have been
thoroughly unsuccessful.$
In this Article, the author endeavors to outline a fair and man-
ageable uniform law on wrongful death. Part II of this Article sum-
marizes the historical development and inadequacies of the diverse
types of wrongful death and survival laws in the United States.
Part III explores the damages recoverable under the existing stat-
utes. Part IV examines two significant proposals for reforming this
area of the law. Finally, parts V and VI contain the author's sug-
gestions for a fair yet manageable wrongful death statute that may
serve all jurisdictions.
II. HiSTORCAL DEVELOPMENT
Under Anglo-American law of the mid-19th century, the
courts did not permit recovery of damages for the wrongful killing
of a human being. A person killing a man's horse, sheep, or dog
could be held liable for damages, but a person killing the man him-
self was immune from civil liability. Two long-standing common
law rules prevented such recovery.4 These two rules were distinct
in origin and import, but they overlapped to the extent that both
2. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 552-56; 1 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:9 (2d ed. 1975); 2 S. SPEISER, supra, § 15:1. Professor Speiser's Appen-
dix A, 2 S SPEISER, supra, at 644-787, contains the texts of applicable federal and state
statutes.
3. This author's own timid attempt in 1960 to suggest a mild form of statutory revi-
sion to improve the situation in Tennessee has received little notice and produced no action
in the intervening 23 years. See Smedley, Wrongful Death Actions in Tennessee, 27 TENN.
L. REV. 447, 497-500 (1960).
4. For an extensive discussion of these rules, see Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of
the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1960).
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precluded civil liability of the perpetrator of a wrongful death. The
first rule prescribed that a personal action abates with the death of
either party; the second rule provided that the killing of a human
being is not a ground for civil cause of action for damages. As ap-
plied to a case of tortious infliction of personal injury, the first rule
prevented recovery of damages by (1) a surviving victim if the
tortfeasor died prior to judgment; or (2) the victim's estate if the
victim died prior to judgment due to the effects of the tortiously
inflicted injuries or due to an independent cause not related to the
tort. The second rule also operated to prevent recovery of damages
by the estate of the victim who died from the effects of the tor-
tiously inflicted injuries, and further prevented recovery by third
parties, including relatives of the victim, who sustained loss due to
the death of the victim.
The English Parliament passed Lord Campbell's Act with two
specific purposes: to create a cause of action for damages for de-
pendents of the victim of the wrongful killing, in order to enable
them to recover for the loss of support and other monetary benefits
that they presumably would have received if the victim had contin-
ued to live, and to provide coincidental relief to society, which
might have had to furnish support for the victim's destitute depen-
dents. Many of the American state legislatures followed Parlia-
ment's lead during the next half century by enacting similar stat-
utes that (1) created a new cause of action, which would not have
existed if the victim had not died of his injuries, (2) for the benefit
of dependents of the wrongful death victim (3) to compensate the
dependents for the losses suffered due to the victim's death. These
"Wrongful Death-Loss to Dependents"' 5 acts had the effect of abro-
gating the second common law rule described above, in regard to
dependents of the decedent; these statutes did not relate to the
first common law rule, as they applied to cases in which both par-
ties to the action-the tortfeasor and the victim's surviving depen-
dents-were still alive.
Other state legislatures took a different approach to the mat-
ter, producing "Wrongful Death-Loss to Estate" acts. This type of
statute established liability of the killer-tortfeasor by preserving
the personal injury cause of action that the victim would have had
if he/she6 had not died from the effect of the tortiously inflicted
5. This author coined the terms for the acts regarding wrongful death and the preser-
vation of personal injury actions discussed herein.
6. Purely in the interest of saving space, this Article will use the masculine pronouns
from this point forward. If she or he prefers, the reader may substitute she, her, hers, or
1984]
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injuries. Such legislation differed from the Loss to Dependents
statutes in that it (1) continued a cause of action which would
have been recognized at common law had the victim not died (2)
for the benefit of the estate of the wrongful death victim (3) to
enable the estate to recover for the losses that the victim suffered
due to the tortiously inflicted injuries. These statutes abrogated
the second common law rule and also the part of the first rule that
related to cases in which the party who died was the victim of the
tort and the death resulted from the tortiously inflicted injuries.
The combined effect of these two kinds of wrongful death stat-
utes, however, still left operational the common law rule that per-
sonal causes of action abate with the death of the tortfeasor or
with the death of the personal injury victim from independent
causes. A third type of legislation removed these two restrictions.
The "Survival of Actions" acts completely abrogated the abate-
ment-of-actions common law rule by making personal ac-
tions-such as defamation, malicious prosecution, false imprison-
ment, and privacy violations, as well as actions for personal
injuries-survive the death of the tortfeasor or the death of the
victim either from the tort or from independent causes.
Of course, the adoption of a Survival of Actions act eliminates
any need for a Wrongful Death-Loss to Estate act because the for-
mer statute served the purpose of preserving a personal injury
cause of action for the benefit of the estate, the very function of
the latter statute. Some state legislatures, however, either through
oversight or through an overabundance of zeal, enacted both Sur-
vival of Actions and Wrongful Death-Loss to Estate statutes. Fur-
ther, some states appear to have both types of wrongful death stat-
utes, as well as a Survival of Actions statute, in force. Thus, in
many states, a wrongful death case might be brought under a Sur-
vival of Actions act, adopted in nearly all states, or under one or
the other type of wrongful death act, or under both types of wrong-
ful death acts. In sum, even before the courts began the tortuous
process of interpreting the new legislation in specific cases, the
seeds of confusion were broadly sown.7
herself in place of he, him, his, or himself without changing the content of the text.
7. While some states require the victim's personal representative to choose to sue
under one or the other of the wrongful death statutes, other states permit parties to sue
under both statutes for the same wrongful death. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 338.
An obvious but difficult problem arises of apportioning the damages between the different
suits whenever parties bring separate suits under different statutes for the same wrongful
death, since some of the same items of loss would be recoverable by various parties.
[Vol. 37:273276
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III. DAMAGES RECOVERABLE UNDER EXISTING STATUTES
As the various statutes became the basis of increasing num-
bers of cases, more confusion and divergence in the law were cre-
ated by the varying interpretations of the broad and ambiguous
provisions of the statutes. It must be noted that the legislatures
have not given the courts much guidance on the matter of what
damages are recoverable. Many of the statutes state only that the
award shall be for "such damages . . . as . . . may be just,"' or
"such damages as [the jury] may think proportioned to the in-
jury,"9 without much indication of what items of loss the award
should include or how to measure appropriate items in dollars and
cents. 10
A. Wrongful Death-Loss to Dependents Statutes
Cases based on Wrongful Death-Loss to Dependents acts pre-
sent a threshold question of whether a cause of action arises for
the death only if surviving kin were actually dependent on the de-
cedent for support. The specific purpose of the original Lord
Campbell's Act clearly required such dependency for a survivor to
recover, and some American courts adopted this view."" American
statutes, however, often are not specific on this issue, and many
jurisdictions have diluted or eliminated the dependency require-
ment so that the mere status of members of the family, next of kin,
or surviving relatives of the decedent qualifies a person as a benefi-
ciary of a recovery under the statutes.12
Regardless of whether or not a jurisdiction imposes a depen-
dency prerequisite, the issue of how to measure the amount of the
recovery remains. If actual dependency is required, then, theoreti-
cally at least, the jury must determine the extent of the loss of
support each individual dependent sustained-parents, spouse,
children (both minor and adult), siblings, and any others who
would have received some financial aid from the decedent had he
lived. In cases concerning multiple dependents, any attempt to cal-
8. E.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1973).
9. Lord Campbell's Act, supra note 1. Lord Campbell's Act has been the model for
many American state statutes.
10. See id.
11. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Bowyer, 141 Ind. App. 86, 169 N.E.2d 409 (1960); Adams
v. Sparacio, 156 W.Va. 678, 196 S.E.2d 647 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Fong Lin v. Probert, 50 Cal. App. 339, 195 P. 437 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1920); Domijan v. Harp, 340 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1960); Pancratz v. Turon, 3 Wash. App. 182,
473 P.2d 409 (1970).
1984]
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culate accurately their several recoveries usually requires very
lengthy consideration of the differing needs of these parties. An
accurate calculation would depend on such diverse factors as the
dependents' ages, health, life expectancies, talents, education,
training, dispositions, and abilities to support themselves presently
and eventually, as well as decedent's age, health, life expectancy,
abilities, education, training, disposition, and legal obligations to
provide support. If no dependency is required, then not only are
these considerations still relevant, but also attention should be
given to the question of which nondependent persons within the
broader beneficiary category may have sustained losses from the
victim's untimely death, and to the amount of those persons'
losses.
An equally difficult problem with which the courts have grap-
pled in applying the Loss to Dependents acts is whether the losses
for which dependents (and nondependent relatives, if they are in-
cluded as beneficiaries) may recover are limited to "pecuniary"
losses.18 Earlier decisions generally imposed this limitation 14 and
essentially confined recovery to the item of loss of support." As
the idea of allowing recovery for wrongful death became less
strange and radical, however, most courts began to expand the
scope of pecuniary damages. This expansion at least includes vol-
untary contributions beyond the necessities of support that dece-
dent probably would have made to his dependents during his life-
time, and might include as well inheritances decedent's survivors
probably would have received at the end of decedent's normal life-
time. Many courts later extended the concept of pecuniary loss be-
yond support, contributions, and inheritances, to less tangible but
still significant benefits that a child or spouse would expect to de-
rive from having a normal family situation-such as the guidance,
education, protection, and nurture that a parent ordinarily pro-
vides for minor children in the home, and the similar benefits that
one spouse provides the other within the marital relationship.
However, courts generally excluded, as nonpecuniary in nature,
13. See 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 2, § 3:1.
14. See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 8.4; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 98. See Blake v.
Midland Ry. Co., 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (1852), for the decision establishing the
pecuniary limitation in the original wrongful death statute, Lord Campbell's Act.
15. In some states, however, which still require pecuniary loss, a presump-
tion-perhaps conclusive-of such loss apparently arises from the mere fact of close kinship
with the decedent. See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619 (D.S.C. 1967); Gil-
more v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 211 Cal. 192, 295 P. 41 (1930); Ellison v. Simmons, 238 S.C.
364, 120 S.E.2d 209 (1961).
[Vol. 37:273
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such factors as loss of companionship, society, and love and affec-
tion. More recently, a number of jurisdictions have relaxed even
this latter limitation, thereby virtually, if not expressly, aban-
doning the pecuniary requirement in those states. 16 Most courts,
however, still reject a plaintiff's requests for damages to compen-
sate the surviving kin of the decedent for their sorrow, grief,
mental anguish, or sense of bereavement arising from the death of
their kinsman;1 7 but in recent decades a few jurisdictions have al-
lowed recovery for these very personal but nonpecuniary losses,18
especially when the victim is a minor child and the suit for dam-
ages is brought on behalf of the parents.1 9
In cases in which the survivors likely would not have received
any substantial benefits from the decedent by way of support, con-
tributions inheritance, or services, the hard-line majority approach
may lead to undesirable results. Unless the courts allow recovery
for such rather tenuous and highly immeasurable harms as grief,
sorrow, and loss of love and affection, no basis usually will exist for
awarding any considerable amount of compensatory damages, and
so defendants. often will be virtually immunized from liability for
their wrongdoing.
16. See Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686 (1973); Jones v. Carvell,
641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982). On these developments in the law, see generally Sea-Land Ser-
vices, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 584-88 (1974). For a review of the changing law in Cali-
fornia from 1862 to 1977, see Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 67-69, 562 P.2d 1022, 1025-
26 (1977).
17. See, e.g., Blaskey v. Wheatley Trucking, Inc., 482 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1973) (inter-
preting Ohio law); Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 187 Cal. Rptr. 863
(1977); Robertson v. White, 11 IlM. App. 2d 177, 136 N.E.2d 550 (1956); Deem v. Town of
Newmarket, 115 N.H. 84, 333 A.2d 446 (1975); DeSanto v. Babino, 168 N.J. Super. 582, 403
A.2d 959 (App. Div. 1979).
18. See, e.g., City of Tuscon v. Wondergem, 105 Ariz. 429, 466 P.2d 383 (1970); Foun-
tain v. Chicago, R.I., & Pa. Ry., 243 Ark. 947, 422 S.W.2d 878 (1968); Mishoe v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. Co., 186 S.C. 402, 197 S.E. 97 (1938); Wilson v. Lund, 80 Wash. 2d 91, 491
P.2d 1287 (1971).
19. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983) (overruling 20 earlier
Texas decisions dating back to 1877). In Sanchez, the court emphasized that the decedent
was a young child whose parents could show little, if any, pecuniary loss from the death.
The cost of rearing a child during minority would almost surely be more than the value of
the services and the earnings of the child during minority; consequently, if recovery were
confined to monetary losses, defendant would not be liable for compensatory damages.
Thus, this decision may not be sound authority for allowing damages for nonpecuniary
losses in adult-death cases.
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B. Wrongful Death-Loss to Estate and Survival of Actions
Statutes
The Wrongful Death-Loss to Estate acts and the Survival of
Actions acts also have permitted divergent interpretations of what
items of loss may constitute the bases for the recovery of compen-
satory damages and of how the specific amounts of such damages
should be measured.20 Inasmuch as these statutes preserve the
cause of action the decedent would have had if he had not died
from the injuries inflicted by the tortfeasor, a logical rule would
allow the victim's estate to recover for generally the same items of
loss, in amounts measured by the same processes, that the dece-
dent would recover if he had survived the tort in a permanently
and totally disabled condition. Of course, this "logical" rule would
be subject to some modifications necessitated by the victim's
death. Under this approach the court could award damages for two
components of harm that the decedent suffered. First, the estate
could recover for the decedent's medical expenses, physical pain
and suffering, and mental anguish, unless death was instantaneous
or so nearly so as to eliminate any interval in which the decedent
could have sustained these elements of harm. Second, the estate
could recover damages for the decedent's loss of earning capacity,
measured as if he had not been injured by the tortfeasor, from the
time of the injury to the end of decedent's preinjury life expec-
tancy, minus the amount that decedent would have devoted to his
own living expenses during his normal life expectancy. Most courts
deduct this latter amount because the victim's death precluded the
need for those expenditures. 2 1 While the logical basis of this gen-
eral approach has been recognized in many jurisdictions, its actual
application in Loss to Estate cases has been subjected to numerous
local variations-some of which make sense and some of which,
unfortunately, do not.
20. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 96; 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 2, § 3:2.
21. To put this latter item a bit cold-bloodedly, the tortfeasor has relieved his victim
of the burdensome necessity of supporting himself for the rest of his expected lifetime, and
in effect, has "mitigated" the damages.
22. For example, the California Survival of Actions statute, CAL. PROs. CODE § 573
(West 1961), which serves the same purpose as a Wrongful Death-Loss to Estate act in
preserving the cause of action that decedent would have had if he had not died from the
injuries, expressly forbids awarding "damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement," even
though decedent actually may have sustained such damages between the time of injury and
death and could have recovered those damages in a personal injury suit if he had not died.
Further, the same section limits the recovery to "such loss or damage as the decedent sus-
tained or incurred prior to death." Id. In any case in which the victim lives for a substantial
280 [Vol. 37:273
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Of course, determining the specific amount of damages to
award the estates of wrongful death victims for these items of loss
inevitably is a difficult and complex process. The determination re-
quires placing a dollar value on such nonpecuniary harms as physi-
cal pain and suffering and mental anguish that the victim endures
when he is under the threat of impending death. It also mandates
the calculation of the length of a specific individual's life expec-
tancy, the dollar amounts he probably would have been able to
earn, and the cost of his own support during the years of his life
expectancy had he been allowed to live out that prospective term.
Finally, it necessitates consideration of such imponderables as
whether and how much the total damages should be discounted to
reduce the award to its present value, whether and to what extent
future inflation should be considered in fixing the award, and
whether and how the measurement of the damages should be af-
fected by income taxation. Nevertheless, fixing the amount of dam-
ages in Loss to Estate cases appears to be a simpler and more man-
ageable process than the comparable process in the Loss to
Dependents cases, wherein lie most of the above mentioned com-
plexities, in addition to others discussed previously in regard to
fixing the separate losses of several individual beneficiaries.
C. Other Problems With Respect to Damages Under All Three
Types of Statues
Further conflicting results in cases decided under the relevant
statutes in the fifty-one American jurisdictions occur with respect
to (1) whether funeral expenses are recoverable as damages, (2)
whether punitive damages are appropriate, and (3) whether the
award in death cases is subject to the claims of creditors of the
estate.
1. Recoverability of Funeral Expenses
The courts have adopted three approaches to the recover-
ability of funeral expenses in cases brought under Survival of Ac-
tions acts and Wrongful Death-Loss to Estate acts. 3 Some courts
period after the injury, and thus incurs medical expenses and also sustains loss of earning
capacity damages both before and after death, two suits must be brought to recover full
damages-one under § 573 for the losses sustained before death, and another under CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 377 (West 1973) for the losses sustained after death. Section 377 ex-
pressly provides for the joinder of such actions. See generally 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 2, at
§ 3:2.
23. See 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 2, at §§ 3:58, 3:66.
19841
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allow reasonable funeral expenses. The propriety of such an award,
however, is questionable because the decedent eventually would
have died, and his estate at that point would have borne some bur-
ial costs. A defendant, therefore, may argue that he did not cause
these expenses to be incurred; he merely may have accelerated
their occurrence. Courts that accept the logic of this argument re-
fuse to allow any recovery for funeral expenses. The third ap-
proach also agrees with our hypothetical defendant's primary con-
tention, but points to the acceleration to justify the rule that
defendant is liable not for the expenses themselves but for interest
on reasonable funeral charges during the period between the actual
death and the date decedent would have died had he lived out his
preinjury life expectancy.
24
Under Wrongful Death-Loss to Dependents acts, no rational
ground for awarding damages to cover funeral expenses appears to
exist since the expenses would not be losses that dependents sus-
tained because of the victim's death. Some courts nevertheless
have allowed dependents to recover for funeral expenses, while
other courts have awarded such recovery only if the dependents
actually paid or were legally liable to pay for decedent's funeral.
2. Recoverability of Punitive Damages
The question of whether punitive damages are recoverable for
a wrongful death seems to have a ready answer based on the func-
tions of the relevant statutes. Since the Wrongful Death-Loss to
Estate and Survival of Actions acts preserve the personal injury
cause of action, punitive damages awards are appropriate in cases
brought under those statutes if the tortfeasor's wrongful conduct
was of such aggravated nature that the jury properly could have
awarded punitive damages if the decedent had survived the tort.
Thus, the jury should determine whether tortfeasor's misconduct
was "malicious, willful, or wanton," "in conscious disregard of the
rights and safety of others," "with reckless indifference to the
threat of harm of others," or whether the tortfeasor's conduct war-
ranted punitive damages under whatever other standard the juris-
diction has adopted. On the other hand, since the Wrongful Death-
Loss to Dependents acts create a new cause of action to compen-
24. This third approach may lead to the anomalous result that the defendant's liabil-
ity could be greater here than under the first approach. The interest on reasonable funeral
expenses, at current high interest rates, likely could amount to substantially more than the
principal amount of the expenses themselves if the decedent is a relatively young person
with a long life expectancy.
[Vol. 37:273
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sate decedent's dependents or next of kin for their own losses aris-
ing from the death, a punitive damages award is not logically sus-
tainable in cases arising under these statutes. Such damages do not
serve a compensatory purpose and would not cover any losses of
decedent's relatives. In some jurisdictions these logical resolutions
concerning the issue of the recoverability of punitive damages are
accepted;2 5 in others, courts illogically have excluded punitive
damages in cases under Loss to Estate or Survival of Actions stat-
utes and illogically have included punitive damages in cases under
Loss to Dependents statutes. 8
3. The Claims of Creditors of the Decedent's Estate
The different nature and functions of the different types of
statutes also provide the key to determining whether or not an
award is subject to the claims of the creditors of the decedent's
estate. If logic and reason were to prevail in this area of the law, an
award of damages obtained under a Wrongful Death-Loss to Es-
tate act or Survival of Actions act, since it serves as compensation
for the loss that the decedent and his estate sustained, would be
subject to the claims of creditors of the estate. On the other hand,
damages recovered under Wrongful Death-Loss to Dependents acts
would be exempt from the claims of the decedent's creditors to
serve more fully the statutory purpose of providing dependents of
the decedent with some source of support and thereby relieving
society of the burden of supporting them. Since legislatures and
courts do not always act on the basis of logic and reason, the na-
ture of the statutes in point does not always determine the rights
of the decedent's creditors to obtain payment out of wrongful
death damages awards.27
One could say more about the complexity and diversity of the
25. See Dunwoody v. Trapnell, 47 Cal. App. 3d 367, 120 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1975) (puni-
tive damages recoverable under survival of actions statute, CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West
1961)). But see, e.g., Tarasoff v. Board of Regents, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976) (no punitive damages recoverable under Wrongful Death-Loss to Depen-
dents statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West 1973)).
26. See, e.g., Burron v. Edwards, 42 Colo. App. 141, 594 P.2d 1064 (1979) (holding that
the Colorado Survival Act did not allow awards of punitive damages); Martin v. United
States Security Servs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1975) (holding that the court may award
punitive damages under a Loss to Dependents statute).
27. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-5-106, -108, (1980). Though the Tennessee stat-
ute primarily is a Wrongful Death-Loss to Estate act, damages awarded under the statute
are free from the claims of decedents' creditors. See Black v. Roberts, 172 Tenn. 20, 108
S.W.2d 1097 (1937); Throgmorton v. Oliver, 144 Tenn. 282, 230 S.W.967 (1921).
1984] 283
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law regarding recovery of damages for wrongful death, but the
foregoing surely suffices to indicate a substantial need for a move
toward greater simplicity and uniformity. s This Article next
surveys two proposals for reforming the law concerning recovery
for wrongful death.
IV. REFORM PROPOSALS
A. The Model Survival and Death Act
Of the several proposals for achieving such reform, this author
notes two widely differing approaches-that of the Model Survival
and Death Act29 and that of Stuart Speiser30 The National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws introduced a re-
form proposal in 1977 as one of its Uniform Acts, but two years
later its designation was changed to "Model Survival and Death
Act."3 ' Although the Model Act attempts to cover both wrongful
28. See 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 2 § 15:1.
29. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
31. UNIF. LAW COMMISSIOmNERS' MODEL SURVIVAL AND DEATH AcT, 8A U.L.A. 591
(1983). The relevant portions of the Model Act appear below:
Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Survival and Death Act
§ 1. [Definitions]
As used in this Act:
(1) "Actionable conduct" means an act or omission that causes the death of a
person for which the person could have brought and maintained a personal injury ac-
tion if he had not died; the term includes an act or omission for which the law imposes
strict liability or liability for breach of warranty.
(2) "Survivors of a decedent" means:
(i) the surviving spouse, ascendants and descendants of the decedent, and
(ii) individuals who were wholly or partially dependent upon the decedent for support
and were members of the decedent's household or related to the decedent by blood or
marriage.
(3) "Closely-related survivors" means the surviving spouse and ascendants and
descendants of the decedent.
§ 2. [Survival Actions]
(a) An action or a [claim for relief] [cause of action]:
(1) does not abate by reason of the death of a person to or against whom it ac-
crued, unless by its terms it was limited to the person's lifetime;
(b) Damages recoverable in behalf of a decedent under this section for an injury caus-
ing his death are limited to those that accrued to him before his death, plus reasonable
burial expenses paid or payable from his estate. Damages so recovered become a part of
the decedent's estate and are distributable in the same manner as other assets of the
estate. This section does not affect the measure of damages allowable under the law for
any other damages recoverable under any other [claim for relief] [cause of action].
§ 3. [Death Actions]
(a) With respect to any death caused by actionable conduct, the decedent's personal
representative, acting in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of the survivors of the decedent,
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death and survival of actions matters, the substantive provisions
are all contained in four short sections totalling only about 750
words, nearly one-third of which serve only to define terms appear-
ing in the statute and to designate the procedure for compromising
wrongful death claims. Obviously, such a brief statute must ignore
entirely a number of controversial points with which the courts
have struggled under state legislation. Furthermore, the wrongful
death section includes alternative provisions relating to several
matters on which different jurisdictions have adopted differing
rules.3 2 The inclusion of these alternative provisions, which allow
different legislatures to establish diametrically opposite provisions
into the law of different states, obviously undercuts the goal of uni-
formity in this area and dilutes the proposal's value as a Model
Act.
In addition to these objections pertaining to lack of uniform-
ity, the proposed Act in some significant respects restricts the ex-
tent of recovery of damages by surviving kin of the decedent. For
may bring and maintain a death action against any person or the estate of any person
legally responsible for the damages, including an insurer providing applicable unin-
sured or underinsured motorist coverage. The death action is subject to all defenses
that might have been asserted against the decedent had he survived.
(d) In the death action, damages awarded to survivors of a decedent are limited to the
following elements:
(1) Medical expenses incident to the injury resulting in death and reasonable
burial expenses, paid or payable by the survivors, to the extent that the decedent's
estate could have recovered under Section 2 had the payments been made by the dece-
dent or his estate; [and]
(2) The [present] monetary value of support, services, and financial contributions
they would have received from the decedent had death not ensued[.] [; and]
[(3) For closely-related survivors, [reasonable compensation for decedent's pain
and suffering before death if not separately recoverable under Section 2, and] reasona-
ble compensation for mental anguish and loss of companionship [not exceeding the
sum of $_].]
(e) Punitive or exemplary damages [are not recoverable] [are recoverable only if they
would have been recoverable by the decedent had death not ensued].
(f) The trier of fact shall make separate awards to each of the survivors entitled to
damages. Conduct of a survivor which contributed to the death is a defense to the
survivor's recovery to the same extent as in other actions.
§ 4. [Joinder of Actions]
Actions under Sections 2 and 3 are separate actions but shall be joined for trial if
they are based upon the same actionable conduct. Separate verdicts and awards shall
be rendered in each action.
32. See id. § 3(d)(2) (concerning the discounting of awards to reflect present value); id.
§ 3(d)(3) (concerning recovery by close relatives for decedent's pain and suffering and for
their own mental anguish and loss of companionship); id. § 3(e) (concerning punitive
damages).
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example, section 1 defines "survivors," for whose benefit the dece-
dent's personal representative may bring wrongful death actions
under section 3(a), to include the spouse and descendants of dece-
dent, but no other persons unless they were actually dependent on
decedent for support and were members of decedent's household
or were related to him by blood or marriage. These latter persons
can recover only the monetary value of the support, services, and
financial contributions that they would have received from the de-
cedent." Section 3(f) appears to require that separate proof of
such losses be produced as to each survivor to justify his recovery.
This is an especially heavy burden if numerous other survivors in
different classifications exist. Finally, the jury faces a correspond-
ingly difficult and complex task in making separate awards to each
survivor entitled to damages. The Model Act also restricts the ex-
tent of damages recoverable by the decedent's estate. No award of
damages to the estate is provided for in section 3; and section 2(b)
restricts damages recoverable on behalf of decedent in survival ac-
tions to those damages accruing to decedent before his death, ex-
cept for reasonable burial expenses paid or payable by the estate.
The estate, therefore, cannot recover damages for decedent's loss
of earning capacity during the period between his death and the
end of this preinjury life expectancy. The purpose of this restric-
tion apparently is to prevent double recovery in a case in which
both the estate and survivors bring claims, under sections 2 and 3,
respectively, for the same wrongful death. 4
Taken together, section 2(b)-no recovery for the estate for
future loss of the decedent's earning capacity-and section
3(a)-only "survivors" may recover wrongful death damages-have
the effect of virtually immunizing a defendant from liability in any
case in which the decedent is killed instantaneously and leaves no
survivors as defined by section 1(2). The decedent in such a case
sustained no substantial premortem damages, and no persons who
qualify as beneficiaries by having lost expected support, services,
or contributions from decedent exist. Furthermore, even if the
tortfeasor's misconduct causing the wrongful death was malicious,
willful, or wanton to a high degree, the tortfeasor would escape lia-
bility because the Model Act under section 2 does not provide for
33. See id. § 3(d)(2).
34. Certainly, to allow the estate to recover for decedent's loss of future earning capac-
ity, and in a separate case to allow dependents to recover for lost support and contributions,




punitive damages in a suit by the decedent's estate, and punitive
damages would not be recoverable under section 3 because no
qualifying survivors exist.3 5 Limiting the recovery to funeral ex-
penses in such cases means that the tortfeasor almost completely
avoids liability for causing a wrongful death, and that the dece-
dent's creditors are deprived of a source of money from which to
obtain payment of their claims.
Another regrettable aspect of the section 2(b) restriction of
damages in survival actions to those damages accruing to decedent
before his death is that obtaining full recovery for all losses sus-
tained in any case in which the victim survives for any substantial
period after being injured usually necessitates two separate
suits-one under section 2 for pain and suffering, medical and fu-
neral expenses, and loss of earning capacity from the time of injury
to the time of death, and another under section 3 for losses that
the survivors sustain because of the victim's death. Some method
should exist to facilitate recovery of all appropriate items through
one action.36
The Model Act's handling of punitive damages seems difficult
to justify. Since a Survival of Actions statute preserves the cause of
action that decedent would have had if he had not died, punitive
damages should be recoverable under such a statutes if the
tortfeasor's misconduct was of an aggravated nature. Section 2(b)
of the Model Act, however, does not include punitive damages in
the items recoverable by decedent's estate. Furthermore, whereas
no rational basis exists for allowing punitive damages in a cause of
action created for the purpose of compensating the decedent's de-
pendents for their losses, one of the alternative provisions in sec-
tion 3(e) of the Act does permit recovery of such damages if the
decedent could have recovered them had he not died.
Section 3(d)(3) of the Model Act contains two other question-
able provisions, both of which would allow the dependents to re-
cover damages not usually considered justifiable under Wrongful
Death-Loss to Dependents statutes. Quite inexplicably, the Model
Act accords closely related survivors3 7 the right to recover for the
decedent's pain and suffering if not recovered in an action under
section 2. How one could regard the decedent's pain and suffering
35. See Model Survival and Death Act § 3(d)(3).
36. Section 4 does provide for joining for trial the separate actions brought under sec-
tions 2 and 3 for the same actionable conduct, but separate verdicts and awards must be
rendered in regard to each action.
37. Id. § 1(3).
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as a loss that even the closest relatives of the decedent sustained is
difficult to understand. The second unorthodox allowance of dam-
ages to dependents permits compensation for the relatives' own
mental anguish and loss of the companionship of decedent. This
provision, like the immediately preceding one, conflicts with the
general rule that limits dependents' compensatory damages for
wrongful death to monetary losses. As already noted, only a small
minority of the courts has recognized the dependents' personal
grief, sorrow, and anguish as proper bases for awarding damages
under either type of existing state wrongful death statutes.
In sum, the Model Act provides a number of unusual and
seemingly inconsistent damages provisions. One may wonder
whether the drafters of the Model Act tried too hard to please ev-
eryone, with a resultant total product that may please no one.
B. The Speiser Proposal
Stuart Speiser has proposed a uniform act that is quite differ-
ent in both form and substance from the Model Act. 8 It contains
twenty sections and covers ten and one-half pages in the author's
comprehensive treatise on wrongful death law, and thus provides a
great deal more detail and coverage than does the Uniform Laws
Commissioners' Model Act. It also takes a specific stand on mat-
ters about which the Model Act contains alternative provisions.
The Speiser Proposal, in contrast to the Model Act, allows
only one action to be brought for a wrongful death, but under sec-
tion 15:6 specifies that this action is for the benefit of both the
decedent's survivors and his estate, and in section 15:8 indicates
which damages are recoverable for the survivors and which for the
estate. This Article first examines the method of ascertaining and
dividing the compensatory damages for pecuniary losses. With re-
spect to the amount of such damages, Speiser states rather ambig-
uously his objective to "compensate [the estate and survivors] for
the destruction of decedent's capacity to carry on life's activi-
ties,"3 9 but the Proposal more specifically requires that the trier
set the amount by determining "the gross amount of the dece-
dent's prospective earnings over the remainder of his life expec-
tancy . . . [minus] the estimated personal expenses that the dece-
dent would probably have incurred for himself, exclusive of any of
38. See 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 2, § 15:22 [hereinafter cited as the "Speiser Proposal"
or the "Proposal"].
39. Speiser Proposal, supra note 38, § S15:8.
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his dependents, over the remainder of his life expectancy . -4"
These damages are then to be divided between survivors and
the estate in accordance with several provisions of the Act. The
survivors' shares include compensation for the loss of amounts that
they would have received from the decedent as contributions to
their support,41 the loss of the decedent's services,42 and the loss of
reasonable expectancy of inheritances from the decedent's accumu-
lations acquired during his life expectancy. 48 After these separate
awards for each survivor are set, any remainder in the already de-
termined gross amount of the decedent's prospective earnings mi-
nus his estimated personal expenses goes to the estate as compen-
sation for the destruction of his "capacity to carry on life's
activities."'44 If no "survivors" exist,45 section 15:9 provides that
"the value of decedent's services. . . [for the time from the date of
injury to the date of termination of the decedent's preinjury life
expectancy] may be recovered for decedent's estate. ' 46 It is not
clear whether this item of recovery is different from the one re-
ferred to in section 15:8, to be measured by the total amount of the
decedent's prospective lifetime earnings minus the personal living
expenses he would have incurred during his normal life
expectancy.
47
In addition to the recovery of compensatory damages for pecu-
niary losses specified in section 15:8, a survivor may recover rea-
sonable medical and funeral expenses of the decedent if that survi-
vor has paid them; in other instances, the estate may recover such
expenses if it has paid them or incurred liability to pay them.48
Further, under section 15:10, survivors may recover for loss of the
decedent's society, which includes not only care, attention, protec-
tion, parental instruction, education, guidance and training, but
also companionship, comfort, kindly offices, filial devotion, and
love and affection. 49 This section does not indicate that deprivation
40. Id.
41. See id. S 15:9.
42. See id.
43. See id. § S15:12; see also id. § S15:8 (summarizes and elaborates upon §§ S15:9,
:12).
44. Id. § S15:8.
45. "Survivors" are persons qualified to recover for the decedent's death and are de-
fined in Speiser Proposal, supra note 38, § S15:4(9).
46. Speiser Proposal, supra note 38, § S15:9.
47. See id. § S15:8.
48. See id. § S15:13.
49. See id. §§ S15:10, S15:4(5).
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of these benefits must include any pecuniary aspect; and section
15:11 sanctions recovery for the survivors' "grief, mental anguish,
solace, emotional pain and sorrow," here expressly without "any
'pecuniary loss'" limitations. For its part, section 15:8 allows the
estate to recover5" for the decedent's "premortem conscious pain
and suffering." 5' 1 Finally, section 15:14 of the Speiser Proposal ex-
pressly sanctions the awarding of punitive damages against the
tortfeasor, but does not indicate whether the estate or the survi-
vors are the proper recipients of such damages; and the puzzling
phraseology of section 15:14 even suggests that the court may
award punitive damages to both.
52
The work of the jury in fixing the damages is enormously com-
plicated by the mandate in section 15:16 that, in regard to all
awards, "the trier(s) of the facts shall state separately, in any ver-
dict, finding or report, the amount awarded to each survivor and/or
to the estate. '5 3 While such a detailed procedure for assessing
damages may be regarded as necessary to attain any substantial
degree of accuracy in providing compensation for the different
types and extents of losses sustained, one well may doubt that ju-
ries can handle the intricate and lengthy deliberations required to
carry out this directive faithfully in cases in which claims are made
on behalf of numerous survivors of varying ages, conditions of
health, and degrees of dependency. Setting damages in cases which
require the determination of the amounts of the various awards to
be made to the estate when decedent did not die soon after sus-
taining the fatal injury would be even more complex.
In an unusually liberal extension of the benefits available in
wrongful death actions, section 15:8 declares that "[i]nterest from
the date of the decedent's death upon the total principal sum re-
covered by the plaintiff under all applicable sections of this Act
shall be added to the total sum awarded by the clerk of the
court. ' 54 Contrary to the long-standing general law in most Ameri-
can jurisdictions, 5 5 Speiser apparently intends to make the recov-
ery of interest a matter of right on highly unliquidated damages,
purely nonpecuniary losses, and even punitive damages. The inser-
tion of this surprising provision would no doubt have the salutary
50. See id. § S15:11.
51. Id. § S15:8.
52. See id. § S15:14.
53. Id. § S15:16.
54. Id. S15:8.
55. See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 165; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, §§ 56-57.
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effect of stimulating good faith efforts by a defendant to make
prompt settlement of a wrongful death claim and also would serve
to compensate a plaintiff for the loss of use of the damages award
from the time that the defendant caused the past losses to the
time that the court entered the judgment.
One must commend the author of this proposed statute for his
thoroughness of perspective, the degree of detail in the various
provisions, and the broad coverage of so many relevant mat-
ters-qualities which are calculated to enable legislatures to estab-
lish with substantial particularity, in one comprehensive statute, a
body of rules to govern recovery of damages for wrongful death.
The courts and their juries, theoretically, at least, would be able to
perceive the law with such certainty and to apply it with such ac-
curacy that the proper items and amounts of damages would be
awarded in the varying circumstances of each wrongful death case.
These very features of the statute, however, may render it so com-
plex in design and so cumbersome in application that the very wor-
thy ultimate purpose would remain unattainable. Perhaps this area
of the law demands, rather than all-inclusive coverage and com-
plete specificity, greater simplicity of terms and ease of application
to facilitate the administration of justice.
V. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION
This Article suggests the following approach for revising the
law and improving the results in regard to the awarding of dam-
ages for wrongful death. The proposal attempts, in a single piece of
legislation, to achieve the basic purposes of the three existing stat-
utes discussed previously. The proposed legislation would conform
closely to a Loss of Estate statute but would include specific provi-
sions for decedent's survivors that actions for the estate's benefit
would not protect adequately. The new legislation should be as un-
complicated as is possible consistent with producing rational and
workable solutions to the theoretical and practical problems of de-
termining appropriate damages to be recovered in wrongful death
cases.
First, the recommended statute should declare that a claim for
damages for personal injuries56 shall not abate or be extinguished
by the death of the alleged tortfeasor or by the death of the alleged
56. The terms of this provision also should include other types of "personal"
harms-such as defamation, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and violation of pri-
vacy-that give rise to "personal actions."
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victim from an independent cause not directly related to the al-
leged tort.57 That provision would include two thirds of the sub-
stantive coverage of the usual Survival of Actions statutes, and
would leave the other one third-the matter of the death of the
tort victim as a result of the injuries caused by the tortfeasor-to
the parts of the statute dealing with wrongful death causes of ac-
tion. Omitting this latter item from the first section would elimi-
nate the confusion of interpretations, duplication of suits, and pos-
sible double recovery resulting from the overlapping of the three-
part Survival of Actions statutes and the wrongful death statutes.
Second, the recommended statute should require that all dam-
ages for the death of a person caused by the misconduct of the
tortfeasor be recovered in a single suit. This section, as in Loss to
Estate statutes, preserves the cause of action for personal injuries
that the decedent would have had if he had not died as a result of
those injuries but rather had survived in a totally and permanently
disabled condition. The fact of the victim's death, of course, would
require some modifications in the scope of recovery. Any needs for
compensation of survivors of the victim which are not met by the
benefits they will eventually receive from the decedent's preserved
cause of action should be met by special provisions allowing such
compensation, rather than by creating an entirely separate cause of
action for the benefit of the survivors.
A. Awards to the Estate
The proposed legislation would permit the estate to recover in
a single cause of action compensatory damages for (1) decedent's
medical expenses, physical pain and suffering, and mental anguish
in the period between the infliction of the injury and death, if the
death was not instantaneous, and (2) the loss of earning capacity of
the decedent from the time of his injury to the end of his preinjury
life expectancy had the tort causing the death not occurred,5 8 mi-
nus the amount of the decedent's reasonable personal living ex-
57. This provision also should address such nonsubstantive matters as the proper par-
ties to be made defendant in a suit against a deceased tortfeasor and to be made plaintiff in
a suit on behalf of the deceased victim of the tort, within what period of time parties must
sue, and that procedure for continuing the suit already brought but not yet prosecuted to
judgment before the tortfeasor or victim died.
58. The amount of the decedents earning capacity would include both (1) the proba-
ble earnings decedent would have recovered as a result of his full exploitation of his earning
capacity during the remainder of his preinjury work-expectancy years, and (2) the probable
amount of pensions and other pecuniary retirement benefits to which he would have been
entitled during the expected years of retirement.
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penses that would have been incurred during the remainder of his
preinjury life expectancy.
Admittedly, such matters as whether to discount the award for
loss of future earning capacity to present value, whether the effects
of possible inflation in the future should be a consideration in set-
ting the amount of this award, and whether such damages are tax-
able or exempt from taxation under income tax laws are relevant
in fixing the proper amount of damages to compensate for the de-
cedent's actual losses. This Article, however, recommends omitting
from the statute any positive rules on these matters, and leaving
their resolution to the courts as the individual cases are tried. Al-
though such omissions from the statute would undoubtedly ham-
per the achievement of uniformity in the law in different jurisdic-
tions, these peripheral matters depend on circumstances which
tend to change as years go by. Consequently, specific rules regard-
ing discounting, inflation's effect, and tax considerations which
seem proper when legislatures enact a statute may well lead to un-
desirable decisions a few years or decades thereafter. Furthermore,
history certainly indicates that legislatures cannot be relied on to
revise the statutes to keep pace with changing conditions, whereas
courts can, and are more readily inclined to, shape their decisions
to achieve that purpose.
The proposed legislation should include specific provisions
concerning funeral expenses and punitive damages. While recog-
nizing the logic of the argument against allowing the estate to re-
cover for funeral expenses, this Article recommends the inclusion
of a provision under which the tortfeasor would be required to pay,
at his option, either the amount of reasonable funeral expenses or
an amount representing the interest on reasonable funeral ex-
penses from the time of the actual funeral to the time that the
victim would have died at the end of his preinjury life expectancy.
In addition to these compensatory damages, the statute expressly
should empower the jury to award punitive damages to the estate
if the tortfeasor's misconduct in causing the death was of the ag-
gravated nature that would have justified a punitive award, under
the standard in effect in the jurisdiction, if the victim had survived
and sued for damages for personal injuries.
The foregoing paragraphs suggest a relatively simple process
for establishing the items of damages that should constitute the
principal award to the estate." This Article next addresses the
59. This Article discusses infra the matters of allowing damages to cover the plaintiff's
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more difficult problems of setting up a fair and workable system
for providing for special needs of the decedent's survivors.
B. Awards to Survivors
The first, and most perplexing, problem concerning the awards
to survivors is dividing the estate's damages for loss of earning ca-
pacity among the survivors. In most of the cases in which society,
or the law as society's spokesperson, has any real concern in this
process-that is, when decedent's closest survivors consist of a
spouse and minor children-simply dividing this part of the estate
according to the laws of intestate succession may well achieve a
good measure of "rough" justice 0-"rough" in that the operation
of such a broad general rule will not always accurately satisfy the
legitimate needs of each particular survivor. Of course, neither are
all survivors' needs likely to be met by hit-and-miss results of the
distributions determined through mysterious processes by various
juries after ponderous deliberations over a mass of ambiguous evi-
dence too complicated to allow for accurate ascertainment of the
actual loss of probable support, contributions, and inheritances of
each of a number of surviving kin. If the intestate succession stat-
utes provide for a reasonable distribution of intestate estates in
general, these same statutes usually should reach equally desirable
results in governing the sharing of the part of a wrongfully killed
decedent's estate that consists of damages for loss of earning
capacity.
The proposed legislation, however, should not blindly endorse
the intestate scheme in all circumstances. For the unusual case in
which the intestate distribution system would leave some worthy
and needy survivors without fair shares of the damages award, the
court-judge, not jury-would have authority to change the dis-
tributive shares so that the particular survivors who need a greater
expenses of litigation and of allowing interest on the principal damages award.
60. Intestate succession statutes are the expressions of the policy-making branch of
the government in regard to how decedents' next of kin need to receive the benefits of es-
tates that decedents have not expressly disposed of by wills. The precise distribution of the
estate among surviving kinspeople varies under the statutes in different states. Generally,
the surviving spouse receives a large share-one third to one half-and the remainder is
divided among the children equally. If there is no spouse, the children divide the entire
estate; if there are no children, the spouse gets everything. If there is neither a spouse nor
children, the parents of decedent are likely to be next in line, and if no parents survive,
decedent's brothers and sisters take the estate. If none of the above is surviving, next of kin
share the estate. For examples of intestacy statutes, see CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 221-226 (West
1974); 6 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 31-203 to -204 (1982).
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amount of support would receive larger shares of the damages
award. Such a resolution of the problem should provide reasonable
results in cases in which one or more surviving kin are unable to
support themselves because of a physical or mental handicap, or in
which some of the surviving minor children need support for a
longer time because they are much younger than the others. Addi-
tionally, if in any given case the persons dependent on the dece-
dent for support include some individuals who are not of close
enough kin to receive benefits under the intestate succession
law-such as an unadopted minor child or a handicapped adult
who lived as a member of the decedent's household, or a
grandchild not being supported by his parents-the proposed leg-
islation would treat those persons as within the primary level of
next of kin for the purpose of receiving distributive shares of the
estate's damages for loss of earning capacity. Finally, when the sur-
viving children of decedent include both minors and adults, the
distribution under the intestate succession statutes would be modi-
fied to give the minor children greater shares commensurate with
their greater need for support.
The proposed legislation would require the plaintiff's counsel
to bring the need for such adjustments to the basic intestate
scheme to the attention of the court and to furnish the basic infor-
mation on which to make modifications in the automatic sharing
plan. Judges probably are better able than juries to make these
determinations because they are, generally speaking at least, legal
experts familiar with the law of damages and its operation. Fur-
thermore, the legislation could authorize the judges to refer the
sharing problems to commissioners with more expertise in this area
and thus relieve juries of lengthy deliberations that delay the
reaching of final verdicts setting the overall damages award.
The proposed legislation would authorize an additional award
of damages to surviving members of the decedent's household for
loss of services in the home. The losses incurred by such persons,
especially the spouse and minor children, from the death of their
kinsperson usually include not only expected monetary support,
contributions, and inheritances, but also less tangible but never-
theless quite significant elements such as counsel, protection, guid-
ance, education, nurture, and training. Inasmuch as these benefits
are impossible to identify, quantify, and evaluate with any sub-
stantial degree of certainty, the proposal would leave the determi-
nation of the amounts of these awards to the discretion of the jury.
The several jurors, in regard to these kinds of losses, are probably
19841
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
better qualified through the experiences of their own lives to make
these determinations than an individual judge acting as a profes-
sional legal expert.
Since society's interest in providing damages to a decedent's
survivors is to compensate survivors for their monetary losses, this
model statute should expressly exclude nonpecuniary considera-
tions from damages awards. Thus, personal deprivations such as
loss of companionship, love, and affection, as well as the survivors'
grief, sorrow, mental anguish, and sense of bereavement would not
affect the damages award. The actual reason for supporting nonpe-
cuniary recoveries, though courts and lawyers do not concede it
frequently, may well be to grant plaintiffs money to help pay attor-
neys fees incurred in the litigation. Since, as stated later herein,
the proposed legislation forthrightly would provide for an award of
reasonable litigation expenses, no need would exist for awarding
nonpecuniary damages to serve this purpose by subterfuge.
The perplexing problem regarding nonpecuniary damages
points up a further advantage of putting the statute primarily in
the form of a Loss to Estate act. In cases of wrongful death of
minor children without dependent survivors, no need would exist
to rely on ambiguous nonpecuniary damages to prevent the
tortfeasors from escaping liability."1 The principal awards usually
would be primarily for loss of the decedent's earning capacity for
the rest of his preinjury life expectancy-likely a substantial sum,
though admittedly one difficult to calculate with accuracy.
Most of the other elements of damages properly recoverable
by the estate-the decedent's premortem physical pain and suffer-
ing and mental anguish, punitive damages, and usually medical
and funeral expenses-have no relation to any loss that even the
closest survivors sustain. Survivors, therefore, have no special
claim for sharing in those damages, except through inheritances
from decedent. Consequently, these damages would become part of
the general assets of the decedent's estate.2
Finally, the proposed legislation would address specifically the
matter of survivors' rights as against the general creditors of the
estate. Based on a balancing of the interests of the estate's credi-
tors, the interests of the survivors, and the interest of society in
having dependents of the decedent receive enough of the damages
61. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
62. An exception would arise if a survivor had actually paid, or become legally obi-
gated to pay, the decedent's medical or funeral expenses. In this case, the court should
award the paying survivor damages for reasonable expenses he incurred.
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award to provide for their support without resort to public
financial assistance, the statute should exempt the following three
awards from estate creditors' claims. (1) Any recovery awarded to
the survivors for having been deprived of the decedent's services in
the home. These awards relate to personal losses of these individu-
als and do not represent assets that would have been available to
satisfy the decedent's debts if he had not been killed. (2) Any
awards specifically designated to actual dependents to compensate
them for loss of support, contributions, and inheritance. Unlike the
first type of exempted damages, these awards do represent moneys
that presumably would have been available to the decedent's credi-
tors to satisfy his debts if he had not been injured. However, soci-
ety's paramount" humanitarian and fiscal concerns justify the ex-
emption of these damages from creditor claims. (3) Awards made
to survivors to reimburse them for the medical and funeral ex-
penses that the survivors have paid or have become liable to pay.
These recoveries seek to satisfy, directly or indirectly, specific
creditor claims that primarily were debts of the estate, and thus
should be exempt from the claims of general creditors."
C. Awards to the Estate and Survivors: Interest and Litigation
Expenses
This Article recommends, for several reasons, that no provi-
sion be included for the allowance of interest on the principal sum
of the damages award. Foremost among these reasons, the largest
part of most wrongful death damages awards, whether for the ben-
efit of the estate or survivors, provides compensation for items of
loss referable to the future. Those losses relate to benefits that de-
cedent or survivors would not have received until some time later
in the decedent's life had decedent continued to live without hav-
ing been injured by the tortfeasor. The estate and survivors, there-
fore, have not lost the use of money to which they were entitled at
some earlier time. Consequently, discounting to present value is
usually a more appropriate adjustment to the award than allowing
interest. Second, most of the damages, except possibly the medical
63. Other money recovered as compensation to the estate for losses or harms sustained
by the decedent, or as punitive damages levied against the tortfeasor because of aggravated
misconduct, would be available to satisfy creditor claims. If any money still remains after
the debts of the decedent and the estate are paid, those funds would be distributed, in the
regular administration of the decedents estate, to the beneficiaries of the decedent's will if
he left a will, or to the survivors by intestate succession if he left no will.
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and funeral expenses, are highly unliquidated and unliquifiable in
nature. Defendant cannot calculate even approximately the
amount of his liability for the wrongful death, and thus cannot pay
the proper amount of damages in advance of the verdict even if he
desires to do so. Third, while the threat of having to pay interest
might motivate defendants to offer reasonable settlements
promptly, plaintiffs might use the same prospect to press unduly
their demands for unreasonably high settlements and to delay the
progress of the litigation in order to build up interest recoveries.
Last, little, if any, rational basis for allowing interest on the highly
discretionary and speculative awards for nonpecuniary compensa-
tory damages and punitive damages appears to exist.
On the other hand, the proposed legislation should include a
provision authorizing recovery of a reasonable amount of compen-
sation for expenses of litigation, including but not limited to attor-
neys' fees, that the plaintiff reasonably incurred in bringing a suc-
cessful wrongful death action. Although this award is as
unorthodox as an interest allowance, and although the award runs
contrary to the traditional view in American states that each liti-
gant must bear his own expenses,64 good reasons exist, especially
applicable to wrongful death cases, for deviating from what may
not be a sound general rule anyhow. First, permitting a jury forth-
rightly to make a specific award for litigation expenses would curb
the common ploy of juries and judges of providing plaintiffs with
reimbursement for litigation expenses (1) by inflating the amounts
of some awards of legitimate compensatory damages items, 5 (2) by
awarding punitive damages in situations in which the defendant's
misconduct was not sufficiently aggravated to justify punishment,
or (3) by inflating punitive damages when only mildly aggravated
misconduct occurred. If plaintiffs ought to have assistance in pay-
ing their litigation expenses, let the deed be done openly rather
than by subterfuge. Second, if plaintiffs' counsel are assured of
reasonable payment for their services out of designated damages
awards, they may be less inclined to demand high percentage con-
tingent fees that reduce the plaintiffs' share of the recovery-an
especially pertinent consideration when several of the decedent's
survivors have a real and long-term need to rely on the damages
for sustenance. Last, the prospect of having to pay the plaintiffs'
64. See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 194; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, §§ 60-61.
65. The jury is especially likely to inflate such discretionary awards as physical pain
and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of the usual benefits of normal family life.
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heavy expenses arising from an extended course of litigation might
serve to motivate defendants to seek early settlement of wrongful
death claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed the essential aspects of a needed
revision of current wrongful death law in America with respect to
what damages should be recoverable and to whom they should be
awarded. It proposes legislation that would adopt what is basically
a Wrongful Death-Loss to Estate statute, but would insert specific
provisions to protect certain interests of decedents' survivors which
would not be adequately protected by actions brought solely for
the benefit of the estates. The primary purpose of this proposal is
to achieve more manageable application of the law and yet to at-
tain the essential goals of recognizing civil causes of action for
wrongful death.6 Acting on these recommendations, expert legisla-
tive draftsmen should be able to draw up a specific model statute
that would achieve the goals of greater clarity, simplicity, and uni-
formity in this important area of the law.
66. In the interest of containing the length of this discussion, this Article deliberately
omits reference to numerous significant matters that do not directly pertain to the "what
and who" of damages awards, but that a complete wrongful death statute should cover.
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